Changing perceptions of conflict: The beneficiaries of Intra-ethnic conflict among the Abakuria Community, Kenya by Kungu, David Mwangi & Omari, Risper Kerubo
   I S S N  2 3 2 1 - 1 0 9 1  
  V o l u m e  1 2  N u m b e r  1  
J O U R N A L  O F  S O C I A L  S C I E N C E S  R E S E A R C H  
 
2505 | P a g e                                               
J a n u a r y  2 0 1 8                                h t t p s : / / c i r w o r l d . c o m                                                                       
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ABSTRACT 
Conflict in many parts of the world has become part of people‟s life resulting in massive deaths, displacement of people 
and trail of destruction to property leading to manmade disasters. In Kenya, conflict is experienced as warring groups 
engage in armed and non-armed conflicts. A peculiar case is that of the Abakuria ethnic group, where inter-clan conflicts 
have become perpetual. The mechanisms used in managing the conflict have been both inadequate and ineffective as the 
conflicts keep recurring. It is on this backdrop that this study aimed at evaluating beneficiaries to the conflict with a view of 
establishing the root causes of intra-ethnic conflict. The study employed descriptive survey, ethnography and explanatory 
research designs. The target population for the study was 52,338 comprising of members of the indigenous conflict 
management systems, members of provincial administration, local and international Non-governmental Organizations, 
Community Based Organizations, Faith Based Organizations, community policing members, members of peace 
committees, civic leaders, District security team, warriors and community members/victims to the conflict. From the target 
population, a sample 638 was selected using purposive sampling, stratified sampling, transect walk and snowball 
sampling techniques. Data were collected using questionnaires, in-depth interviews and focus group discussion. 
Quantitative data generated from the study were analysed descriptively while qualitative data were analysed following the 
five steps of thematic data analysis: transcription, open coding, axial coding, selecting codes and formation of themes. The 
study established that there were several categories of beneficiaries to intra-ethnic conflict including government officials, 
traders, consumers, households, politicians and members of the traditional institutions. The study recommends that there 
is need to enlighten the community on the negative effects of intra-ethnic conflict. In addition, cartel of  beneficiaries of 
such conflict who work to catalyse the conflict for their own benefit should be severely punished.  
KEY WORDS: Intra-Ethnic Conflict, Conflict, Beneficiaries to conflict, Kuria conflict  
INTRODUCTION 
Ethnic conflict in every society is almost inevitable, as most of the conflicts are resource based yet resources are often 
scarce and competition for them leads to unequal distribution. In fact, conflict is a phenomenon that has caused global 
devastation. However, the developing world, and especially Africa, has been the hardest hit. According to Wanyama 
(2000), conflicts have cost Africa a fortune as they are so intense that they lead to massive destruction of property, loss of 
lives and population displacements among many other evils. In support of this, Leith and Solomon (2000) opine that ethnic 
conflicts are among the major challenges facing the world, as they have a compounding influence on political, economic 
and social stability. In Kenya, conflicts between different clans or groups of a community have occurred since time 
immemorial. However, such cases have been rampant in the recent past. According to Sikuku (2011), there has been 
protracted violence in Mt. Elgon region between the Sabaot Land Defence Forces of Soy clan and Moorland Forces of the 
Mosop clan leading to massive loss of lives and property.  
In dealing with these conflicts, the conventional efforts have proved futile as the conflicts keep recurring in most 
communities. The case of Somali where there has been conflict for over two decades, the Niger delta where there is a 
never ending conflict explains this case better as not even UN and AMISOM peace keepers have managed to calm the 
situation, a revelation that there must be under current forces with not only ignite but also catalyse the conflict.   
In Kenya, several communities have also been in never ending conflicts. To begin with, the conflict between the Turkana 
and the Pokot communities, the Pokot and the Marakwet, the Pokot and the Tugens, the Tugens and the Samburu dates 
to hundreds of years and not even government interventions have managed to calm down the situation (Ruto, et al  2004). 
The communities traditional mechanisms for managing conflict for instance  the Adakar (Livestock Neighborhood 
Association) which is an important traditional governance and conflict resolution institution which resolves conflicts at 
community/clan level and the Ekitoe Ng’ekeliok which deals with issues that are beyond the capacity of Adakars especially 
conflicts between the various clans and those between the Turkana and other communities has not borne any fruits. The 
same case applies among other Kenyan communities, the Abakuria being one of them. 
Statement of the Problem 
Conflict between the different Abakuria clans has been going on since time immemorial (Abuso, 1980). For instance, 
according to Marwa (2001), between 1986 and 1996, there were a number of inter-clan conflicts among various Abakuria 
clans that resulted in massive human and non-human destruction. In another case, OCHA (2009) noted that between July 
and September 2009, conflict in Kuria District between the Nyabasi and Bwiregi clans displaced over 20,000 persons and 
left a trail of deaths and destruction of property.  
In managing conflicts between Abakuria clans several mechanisms have been put in place such as government 
intervention through disarmament, establishment of police stations, peace caravans by the National cohesion and 
integration commission, peace efforts by the religious groups and even the indigenous approaches. However, even with 
these institutions in place, conflict between various clans in the community has persisted for a long period of time. It is 
from this backdrop that this paper sought analyse the beneficiaries to intra ethnic conflict between the Abakuria clans.  
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Justification of the study 
The study was justified since Kenya as a country and Africa in general has experienced conflicts, many of which have 
persisted for a very long time and therefore the findings of the study will help in establishing and understanding the forces 
behind the conflict with a view of addressing the problem.  
In addition, the inter-clan armed conflict among the Abakuria has persisted despite the existence of conflict management 
institutions such as the local county security administration and the Abakuria indigenous conflict management mechanism 
known as Inchama. The findings of this study will help in suggesting more effective ways of managing this conflict.  
Finally, the study gives an input to the body of knowledge with its contribution to the understanding of intra-ethnic conflict 
and the beneficiaries to the conflict. 
Study Area 
The Abakuria are an ethnic and linguistic group resident in the Tarime and Serengeti districts of the Mara region in 
Northern Tanzania, and the larger Kuria District (divided into Kuria west and Kuria east districts) of Nyanza Province, 
Migori County in southwest Kenya. However, the data for the research was collected from the Abakuria resident in Kenya, 
who spread over the larger Kuria Districts: Kuria West consisting of the Bagumbe and Bukira clans and Kuria East 
composed of the Nyambasi and Bwirege clans. According to the 2009 census, the Kuria East District had 81,883 persons 
and 13,513 households spread in two divisions Kegonga and Ntimaru, While Kuria west District had 174,293 persons and 
28,257 Households (KNBS, 2010), spread in two administrative divisions Mabera and Kehancha, therefore a total of 
population of 256,176 persons and 51,770 households. The study area is shown in figure 3.1.  
 
Figure 3.1: Map of the Study Area 
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Source: District Development Plan Kuria District 2008-2013 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The study employed descriptive survey research design to collect quantitative and numbered data using questionnaires. 
Ethnographic research design was also used. Since indigenous systems of managing affairs among the Abakuria clans 
have been in place since time immemorial (Abuso, 1980), this design was found appropriate. The study also employed 
explanatory sequential design. In the words of Creswell and Plano (2011), the design is a procedure for collecting, 
analyzing and mixing both qualitative and quantitative methods in a single study to understand a research problem.  
 
The target population for the study was 52,338 as shown in table 1. This comprised of members of the Abakuria 
indigenous conflict management institutions that is the Inchama and institutions under it which include Avaragoli, Iritongo, 
Sungusungu and Ihama, who are the custodians of information on indigenous conflict management. Also included were 
members of provincial administration, the District security team, Civic leaders, Non  Governmental Organisations, 
Community Based Organisations, Faith Based Organisations, Peace committees, community policing committees, 
warriors and the community.  
 
To obtain the required information for this study, the members of the target population were stratified and a sample drawn 
from each. This was embraced to ensure each category of the target population was captured and to get a sample 
representative of the population. After stratification, the executive (the chairman, secretary and treasurer) members of the 
Inchama, Iritongo, Sungusungu and ihama formed the sample and hence purposively selected. Since there were four 
clans each with a distinct structure, a total 48 members from 176 were selected for inclusion in the study. The choice of 
the executive members was informed by the fact that they are the custodians of information for their respective groups 
thus information obtained from them representative of other members.  
 
Key informants from members of the Interior ministry also formed the sample. This included 2 Deputy County 
Commissioners and 5 Assistant County Commissioners who were selected using the census method. Also forming part 
this cluster were 12 chiefs and 23 assistant chiefs who were purposively selected from conflict hotspots. In total the cluster 
had a sample of 42 participants.  
Table 1: Sample Size 
Population Description Target Population Sample  
Members of indigenous institutions 176 48 
Provincial Administration 77 42 
Civic Leaders 13 7 
DAPC, OCS and OCPD 13 13 
Non-governmental, Community 
Based organizations and Faith 
Based Organizations 
110 33 
Community policing and peace 
committee  
145 37 
Warriors  40 8 
Community members (Victims) 51770 450  
                                        Total 52,338 638 
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Source: Researcher Data 2013  
The Civic leaders (Members of County Assembly) also formed the sample. Out of the total 15 Civic leaders, 7 were 
purposively selected from conflict hotspot areas for inclusion in the study. The Sub County security team also formed the 
sample. Because their work covered the conflict hotspot and non-hotspot areas, all the 13 members were included in the 
sample thereby census sampling 
The executive committee members (Chairman, secretary and treasurer) of three NGOs, four CBOs and four FBOs also 
formed part of the sample. Therefore, from the total of 110 members, 33 were purposively selected for the study.  Also 
included were community policing members and members of the local peace committees. From a target of 145 members, 
the executive members (chairman, secretary and treasurer) of Sub-County and Divisional community policing and peace 
committees (36) and the peace monitor (1) were purposively selected thus a total sample of 37 participants. This was 
based on the assumption that the executive committee members were the custodians of information for their respective 
groups. This category of respondents helped in providing information related to the role of indigenous institutions in 
managing conflict, the challenges that could be affecting them in the management of conflict and the complimentary role 
that they play in managing conflict.  
Also forming part of the study were 40 Abamuraa (warriors) involved in conflict out of whom only 8 formed the sample and 
were selected through snow balling and convenience sampling. Those selected were the warrior leaders and their 
deputies. Also included in the study were households selected by transec. From the households selected, the household 
head at the time of conducting the study was included in the study upto a desired sample of 450. The sample of 450 was 
distributed across the conflict hotspots in the two districts each representing a quadrant with 225 respondents. In total, a 
total sample size of 638 was selected. This was determined according to Mugenda and Mugenda (2003) formula 
n=Z
2
(p.q)/d
2 
which states that for populations larger than 10,000, a sample of 384 or more is adequate and representative 
of the entire population. The researcher chose a sample of 638 which was more than 384 in order to reduce chances of 
some questionnaires not being returned thus falling short of the set target.  
The data were collected using questionnaires, interviews and focus group discussions. Quantitative data were analysed 
descriptively using frequencies and percentages and presented in tables and charts while qualitative data were analysed 
using the five thematic steps: transcription, open coding, axial coding, selecting codes and formation of themes. (Jwan and 
Ong‟ondo, 2011)  
Table 1: Sample Size 
Population Description Target Population Sample  
Members of indigenous institutions 176 48 
Provincial Administration 77 42 
Civic Leaders 13 7 
DAPC, OCS and OCPD 13 13 
Non-governmental, Community Based 
organizations and Faith Based Organizations 
110 33 
Community policing and peace committee  145 37 
Warriors  40 8 
Community members (Victims) 51770 450 
                                        Total 52,338 638 
 
Source: Researcher Data 2013  
Results and Discussion 
Persistence and recurrence of conflict among the different Abakuria clans is an indicator that there could be silent forces 
that benefit from it and would not like it ended. Kemp (2004) opines that when analyzing conflict, one must start from the 
assumption that there are people who have a vested interest in the instability. Such people thrive in an environment in 
which they can exploit resources, exercise coercion, and accumulate enough wealth and control to keep them in power. In 
extreme forms, internal conflicts are the deliberate creation and maintenance of „war economies‟, situations which accrue 
significant benefits for an array of local and international actors (Keen, 1998). Data for this section emanated from open-
ended questions, interviews and Focused Group Discussions. The results are presented in figure 4.6.  
   I S S N  2 3 2 1 - 1 0 9 1  
  V o l u m e  1 2  N u m b e r  1  
J O U R N A L  O F  S O C I A L  S C I E N C E S  R E S E A R C H  
 
2509 | P a g e                                               
J a n u a r y  2 0 1 8                                h t t p s : / / c i r w o r l d . c o m                                                                       
 
 
Figure 4.6: Beneficiaries to the Conflict 
Source: Research Data 2013 
The findings revealed the following categories of beneficiaries of conflict: 
 a). Government officials:   
245 (59.9%) of the community members indicated that government officials including District Commisioners (DC), District 
Officers (DO) and Chiefs benefitted from cattle rustling. Some members of these institutions in collaboration with Iritongo 
and Inchama levied inflated fines on offenders, in order to draw higher payments for their arbitrating services.   
At another level, perpetrators of livestock theft, bribed chiefs, being the security officers at the lowest level, in order for 
them to protect and conceal their criminal activities. An interview revealed that in 2005 the serving District commissioner of 
the larger Kuria District then had accumulated a herd of up to 100 cattle, which he sold to the Kenya Meat Commission. In 
another incident, it was reported that the Kuria East District Commissioner(DC) between 2008 and 2010 used to benefit 
from livestock stolen by the Bwirege clan members from other clans and in exchange defended the clan whenever there 
were complaints about their open animosity. He was eventually transferred to another station upon mounting pressure 
from the public. 
 In support of this, a warrior noted; 
What we do is well known to the chiefs, DO’s and even DC’s. There is no way we can have conflict for 
several years without knowing who is causing it. We cannot have cattle raids day in day out without 
knowing the perpetrators. We eat together...(An interview with a warrior from Bagumbe clan, 25
th
 
October, 2012). 
b).The police department:  
The policewas also a great beneficiary of the conflict. The study established that the warriors, in their raids, not only used 
homemade guns but also bought or hired others from the police. The police then would share the proceeds from the raids. 
In addition, most perpetrators in the conflict who were handed over to the police were never charged since they bribed 
their way out either in person or through politicians whose interests they seemed to serve. A respondent in an interview 
noted;  
Can you ask yourself how many rounds of ammunition we use when we have armed conflict for several 
months/?.......a lot. Ask yourself where we get them from... it is them (referring to the police) who sell the 
ammunition to us. We either pay in cash or give cows in return (Interview with warrior, Nyabasi clan, 8
th
 
December, 2012). 
c). Politicians:  
196 (47.9%) of the community members indicated that politicians, too, were beneficiaries of conflict. Some politicians 
financed the conflict in order to reap from the loot acquired by perpetrators. One case noted was that of a councillor in 
Ntimaru who had many guns for hire. Those hiring paid a certain fixed fee, or in exchange for four (4) cattle per gun, or per 
raid.  He was also known to buy stolen livestock at very low prices for resale either to the Kenya Meat Commission or the 
neighbouring Tanzania. Other politicians from the area also used armed conflict to fight, oppress or intimidate their 
opponents especially during electioneering periods. They used the warriors to destabilise their competitors‟ regions. In 
support of this a warrior quipped; 
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The politicians in Kuria have to pledge loyalty to us because without us they are finished. We protect 
them and even campaign for them and in return if we need money from them, we get it with ease...they 
must accept our demands otherwise if they refuse they will have it rough...remember what happened to 
our MP in 2007 (referring to an incident where the area MP was almost killed)...that was a lesson to 
others (Interview with a Warrior Nyabasi clan, 8
th
 December, 2012). 
d). Traders/businessmen/middlemen: 
 It was indicated by 154 (40.0%) of the community members that some people involved in business also benefited from 
the Kuria conflict. This category of beneficiaries was considered to operate at two levels. At the first level were traders who 
purchased stolen livestock at low prices and sold them at higher prices in urban centres or to the Kenya Meat Commission 
where they could realise relatively high profits.  This category also included livestock butchery owners who bought the 
stolen livestock and slaughtered them by night for sale in butcheries. In the process, they were said to be making huge 
profits as they normally bought the livestock at low prices. Some warriors owned butcheries too where they slaughtered 
cattle acquired through theft. Also in this category were transport service providers who charged extra high fees to 
transport the stolen livestock from raiding points to the market.  
At the second level, the dealers in arms and weapons used in raiding and conflict were also key beneficiaries to conflict. 
These included persons who made and sold bows, arrows, spears, guns and other traditional weapons used during raids 
and inter-clan war; and the sellers of guns and ammunition. In most cases, before raids and planned conflicts, members of 
the community replenished their stock of weapons in a bid to make their raids successful. In addition, after raids the 
community members refurbished worn out weapons thus enhancing marketability for such weapons. 
e). Indigenous Institutions:  
Members of indigenous institutions in the management of conflict including the Inchama, Avaragoli, Iritongo, Sungusungu 
and Ihama also befitted from the conflict. This was supported by 158 (38.6%) of the community members. To begin with, 
the Inchama, Avaragoli and Iritongo received a share of stolen livestock for successful raids as a token for providing 
charms to protect the warriors who were responsible for conducting raids. In addition, when they charged fines to 
offenders, they exaggerated the fees which was always paid in form of livestock. The Sungusungu and Ihama as well 
benefitted from the conflict as they were paid after successfully returning stolen livestock and punishing suspected 
offenders in a bid to force them to admitting to the crimes they were accused of committing. An interview with a warrior 
also revealed the same as he noted; 
For every successful raid that we conduct the Inchama and Avaragoli must be paid something (referring 
to livestock), you don’t give them, then you will have nowhere to run to next time you want to go for a 
raid...who will provide you with charms?...(Interview with warrior Nyabasi clan, 8
th
 December, 2012). 
f). Consumers:  
Other beneficiaries were consumers as agreed by 134 (32.8%) of the community members. In this category were families 
who received stolen livestock either directly as domestic assets, those that received them in form of dowry and consumers 
of meat and milk in cultural ceremonies. This was supported by FGD participants as one reiterated; 
Can you imagine the magnitude of celebration in that home where dowry of a herd of 10 cows is paid as 
dowry? Such a family is a great beneficiary of conflict and will always pray that it continues so that they 
continue enjoying the trickle down effects. Now young men no longer fear to marry as cows are readily 
available at affordable prices. (Interview with peace monitor, 8
th
  December, 2012). 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
These findings point to the fact that conflict benefited an array of people both within and outside the community. The 
beneficiaries could ignite, fuel and sustain the conflict for their own personal gains. In view of this it is recommended that 
the government and other stakeholders undertake a comprehensive awareness creation on the impacts of the conflict. 
The mass media can play a key role in this. The awareness programme should be a whole package highlighting the 
negative impacts of the conflict vis a vis benefits of maintaining peace not only in the study area but in the entire country. 
This can be achieved by comparing the same districts in conflict and peace situations, the development scenario in conflict 
zones and peaceful areas of the same district and development situations in conflict prone areas and peaceful districts. 
Such benchmarking will make people in conflict zones compare and contrast development levels in their areas with those 
of other areas thus making informed choices of whether to continue with conflict or abandoning it for their own common 
good. 
In addition, government officials, politicians and other leaders found culpable of perpetuating conflict should be met with 
the full force of the law.  
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